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1.

Introduction

In law, judges often use arguments in which they refer to 'reasonableness' to justify
their decision. In legal theory, one of the central questions is whether it is allowed to use
extra-legal or moral considerations, such as reasonableness, to justify a legal decision. In
certain contexts, an argument from reasonableness is an accepted consideration to defend a
legal decision. For example, in Dutch civil law, according to clause 6:248 of the Civil Code, a
judge is allowed to make an exception to the general principle that a contract binds the
parties: a rule that is the result of a contract does not apply if this would be unacceptable in
the concrete circumstances according to standards of reasonableness and fairness.1
However, there are other forms of arguments referring to reasonableness that are
controversial. Often judges refer to reasonableness to justify the decision not to apply a
particular legal rule in the proposed literal interpretation in a concrete case because
application would lead to unacceptable results that are incompatible with the goals the rule is
intended to realize. When a judge refers to such a 'reasonable application of law', he claims
that the results of application would be unacceptable because they would be incompatible
with certain goals and values the rule is intended to realize from the perspective of a rational
legislator.
In international legal theory, arguments from unacceptable consequences are called
'arguments from absurdity', 'reductio ad absurdum' or 'apagogical arguments'.2 In the Dutch
legal literature this form of argument is called a 'reasonable application of law'. As to the
acceptability of such arguments from unacceptable consequences referring to reasonableness,
in the legal literature, there are different views. Some authors are of the opinion that such
arguments can be acceptable under certain conditions. Other authors think that it is a less
suitable way of applying legal rules because the judge decides autonomously, without
referring to accepted interpretation methods, what reasonableness in a concrete case
prescribes.3 In ethics and in argumentation theory, the argument from unacceptable
consequences, also called the reductio ad absurdum, is, in principle, considered as an
acceptable way of defending a normative statement.4 So, the question is what these different
forms of arguments from unacceptable consequences that refer to reasonableness amount to
in a legal context and whether and under what conditions they are an acceptable way of
defending a legal decision.
I will approach these questions from the perspective of pragma-dialectical theory.
Using this theoretical perspective, I will give a reconstruction of the complex structure of this
form of argumentation and, taking into account legal-theoretical and legal-philosophical
ideas, I will establish under what conditions arguments from unacceptable consequences that
refer to reasonableness can be an acceptable justification of a legal decision and what forms
1
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of rational critique are relevant in the evaluation.
In 2 I start with an overview of the descriptions in legal theory of various forms of
arguments from unacceptable consequences referring to a reasonable application of law and I
discuss the conditions under which this form of argumentation can be an acceptable way of
justifying a legal decision. Then, in 3, I give a pragma-dialectical reconstruction of the
structure and content of the argumentation. In 4 I explain how the legal-theoretical ideas
about a correct use of this form of argumentation can be translated in terms of critical
questions for the evaluation.

2.

Arguments from unacceptable consequences and a reasonable application of law

In 2.1 I start with an overview of the various descriptions in the legal literature of
forms of argumentation from unacceptable consequences referring to reasonableness,
argumentation in which a judge defends his decision not to apply a rule in a concrete situation
by claiming that application would lead to unacceptable or absurd results from the
perspective of a reasonable application of law. In 2.2 I discuss the ideas of various legal
authors about the adequacy of this form of argumentation as a justification of a legal decision.

2.1

Descriptions of arguments from unacceptable consequences in legal theory

With respect to what I call arguments from unacceptable consequences referring to a
reasonable application of law, in their international research project on the use of various
forms of interpretative arguments in various legal systems, MacCormick and Summers
(1991:485-486) conclude that in all legal systems discussed in this project it is acknowledged
that there can be a conflict between application of a legal rule in its literal interpretation and
the observation that application in this interpretation would lead to an absurd or a manifestly
unjust result. This 'argument from absurdity' or 'argument from justice' takes on a different
form in various legal systems. Sometimes it is formulated in terms of a presumption or
presupposition to the effect that the legislature does not intend absurd or manifestly unjust
outcomes. In other cases it is constitutionalized and is thus formulated as an argument that
invalidates the absurd or manifestly unjust result.
The common aspect of these forms of argumentation is that the judge refers to the
consequences of the application of the rule in its literal interpretation and gives a negative
evaluation of these consequences. This negative evaluation is based on the consideration that
this outcome is incompatible with the purpose of the rule and the intentions of a rational
legislator. The presumption or presupposition of the rational legislator is that he cannot have
intended that a rule should be applied in a concrete case if application would lead to an
absurd or unjust outcome that is incompatible with the goal of the rule. The judge claims that
the final outcome would be unacceptable from the perspective of a reasonable application of
law, because a reasonable application of law implies that application of a legal rule should
not yield results that are incompatible with the intention of the rational legislator, with the
goals and values underlying the rule.5
Various authors consider an argument from absurdity as a specific form of
teleological argumentation in which the objective purpose, the rational ends or values that a
statute is considered to have, the rational intention of the legislator, the so-called ratio legis,
is reconstructed.6 This rational intention is not the intention of the historical legislator but the
reconstructed intention of a rational legislator who is supposed to intend a rule to have
2
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reasonable results. As such it is a specific form of objective-teleological argumentation.7
In the Dutch legal literature, the decision not to apply a legal rule because application
would lead to absurd or unjust consequences is called a 'reasonable application of law'. A
reasonable application of law may occur in a situation in which there is discussion about the
correct interpretation, but also in situations in which the meaning of the rule in the context of
the concrete case is clear.
Various authors consider a reasonable application of law as a specific form of
teleological argumentation.8 The judge departs from the literal meaning of the rule on the
basis of the intention of the legislator. It is argued that the legislator, if he had thought of the
present case, would have admitted an exception for the present case because the
consequences would be incompatible with the goal of the rule. Wiarda (1999:39) contends
that an argument from reasonableness should not be considered as an argument contra legem
(which would imply that only a linguistic interpretation is allowed), but as an argument based
on the intention of the legislator.9
The German legal theorist Alexy (1989:283-284) gives a description of the structure
and elements of argumentation from unacceptable consequences which he calls the reductio
ad absurdum.10 He formulates the following argumentation scheme:11
(J.17)

(1)
(2)
(3)

The unacceptable result Z should be prohibited (O-Z)
Interpretation R' of rule R would result in the unacceptable result Z (R'
→ Z)
Interpretation R' is inadmissable (-R')

Alexy (1989:237) considers this argument from absurdity as a specific form of the general
scheme (J.4.2) he formulates for teleological argumentation in a legal context:
(J.4.1)

(1)
(2)

R' (interpretation R' of rule R) is intended by the legislator
R'

(J.4.2)

(1)
(2)

R is, for the legislator, a means to end Z
Unless R' obtains, Z does not obtain (that is, R' is a condition for Z) (R' → -Z)
Interpretation R' is desirable (R')

(3)

To make the argumentation complete, the following rule of inference is necessary:
'If it is mandatory to realize Z then whatever means are necessary for the
realization of Z are also mandatory'12
The argumentation underlying this rule of inference is expressed in (S):
(S)

(1)
(2)
(3)

It is mandatory that the state of affairs Z obtains (OZ)
Unless M obtains, Z does not obtain (that is, M is a condition of Z) -M
→ -Z
It is mandatory that M obtains (OM)

However, Alexy (1989:237) does not specify how the general scheme (S) should be
translated to (J.17). (S) presents the action M as obligatory, while (J.17) presents the
interpretation R' as inadmissible. A translation of S to J.17 is not completely unproblematic.
3
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According to Alexy, (1) and (2) should be justified in their turn. It should be defended
that Z is unacceptable and that R' would result in Z. In his view, argument (1) connects this
argument form with legal discourse and argument (2) with general practical discourse.
However, he does not specify further how these two arguments in support of 1 and 2 should
be reconstructed and how the arguments would relate to each other. So, Alexy offers us some
basic ideas about the elements of the argument from absurdity and the structure of this
argumentation scheme, but he offers no instrument for a reconstruction of the complex
structure of a complete argument from reasonableness in a concrete case.

2.2

The adequacy of arguments from unacceptable consequences referring to
reasonableness as a justification of a legal interpretation

In legal theory, the question whether arguments from unacceptable consequences
appealing to a reasonable application of law can function as a sound justification of a legal
interpretation is approached from the perspective of the hierarchy of interpretation methods.
In the international research project on interpretative arguments MacCormick and Summers
(1991:512 ff.) describe the hierarchy of interpretative arguments that is acknowledged in
most countries, and that we also find in the legal literature in the Netherlands.
This hierarchy is based on the idea that, from the perspective of legal certainty,
arguments that refer to the explicit formulations (linguistic argumentation) and intentions of
the legislator (systematic argumentation) have priority. And if neither a linguistic nor a
systematic interpretation offers an acceptable solution, judges may use teleological/evaluative
arguments that refer to the intentions of the legislator and the goals and values that he is
supposed to have wanted to realize with the rule. From the perspective of this hierarchy,
arguments from absurdity and arguments from justice belong to this last category.
Since argumentation from unacceptable consequences in the context of a reasonable
application of law invokes the (reconstructed) intention of a rational legislator, the question is
what the terms 'reasonable' and 'rational' refer to in a legal context. Following Perelman
(1979), Aarnio (1991:152-153) uses the terms reasonable and rational to explain the relation
between a reasonable interpretation of legal rules and the concept of the rational legislator in
situations in which a judge justifies his decision by arguing that application of a rule in the
literal interpretation would lead to unacceptable results. In Aarnio's view, in law, the concept
of reasonableness refers to the requirements of the application of legal norms by the judge in
concrete cases and the concept of rationality to the requirements of legislation.
Aarnio holds that the concept of the 'rational legislator' implies that the legislator is
supposed to seek consistency in every legislative act; in other words, rationality implies a
tendency to avoid conflicts between legal rules. At the same time it means that the legislator
is not assumed to seek an absurd result.13 In the context of absurd consequences of
application of a legal rule in a concrete case Aarnio (1991:131) contends that a choice for a
reasonable application implies that the judge chooses the solution that is consistent with the
intentions of a rational legislator who cannot have intended an absurd result.14
Other authors such as Bankowski and MacCormick (1991:371-313), La Torre, Pattaro
and Taruffo (1991:222) and Peczenik (1991:312, 340) who contribute to the international
research project on interpretative arguments come to a similar conclusion. A reasonable
application of law implies that application of a legal rule that leads to an
absurd/unjust/unreasonable result that is incompatible with the goals and values of the
legislator may be corrected by making an exception to the rule because a rational legislator
cannot have wanted an unreasonable result.
4
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If the law is considered as a rational, that is as a coherent, consistent, goal-oriented
and morally acceptable system of rules and principles, a reasonable application of legal rules
implies that a judge tries to give effect to these rational ideas by only applying a rule in a
concrete situation if it is in accordance with these rational starting points.15 A reasonable
application of law may thus result in departing from the literal words of the rule and
interpreting it in the way that accords best with these rational starting points.
So, on the basis of these ideas a judge who decides not to apply a rule in its strict
literal interpretation on the basis of the unacceptable consequences has a special burden to
justify his decision. First, he is obliged to justify why a literal and a systematic interpretation
do not offer an acceptable solution. Second, he must explain why the consequences of the
decision are unacceptable from the perspective of a rational legislator by referring to the
goals, principles and values underlying the rule under discussion.
In the following, in 3, I will establish what the argumentation that has to be put
forward according to these obligations amounts to and in 4 I will explain how the legal norms
of correctness connected to these obligations can be formulated in terms of critical questions
for the evaluation.

3.

A pragma-dialectical reconstruction of arguments from unacceptable consequences in
the context of the application of law

Starting from the legal-theoretical descriptions of arguments from unacceptable
consequences in the previous section, in this section I will explain how the argumentation
that a judge is obliged to give from the ideal point of view can be reconstructed from a
pragma-dialectical perspective. I will show that the advantage of this perspective is that it
enables us to establish that the different forms of argumentation from unacceptable
consequences can be reconstructed as variants of a specific form of complex argumentation
that is often used in law. This complex argumentation consists on the main level of pragmatic
argumentation and on the subordinate level of objective-teleological argumentation. Having
reconstructed the argumentation schemes underlying the argumentation on the different
levels, it can be established which forms of rational critique are relevant with respect to these
argumentation schemes.

3.1

A pragma-dialectical reconstruction of the structure and content of the argumentation

In the reconstruction of argumentation from unacceptable consequences it is
important to make a distinction between two different contexts in which argumentation from
unacceptable consequences is put forward, because they have different consequences for the
reconstruction of the argumentation.
In the first context (A), a judge decides not to apply a legal rule in its proposed strict
literal interpretation. In this context there is only one standpoint: 'rule X should not be applied
in the strict literal interpretation X' (-X). In the second context (B), a judge decides not to
apply a legal rule in the literal interpretation X' but in another interpretation X'' because X'
would have unacceptable results and X'' has acceptable results. In this context there are two
standpoints: (1) rule X should not be applied in interpretation X' (-X') and (2) rule X should
be applied in interpretation X''. (+X''). In the second context, as we will see, the structure of
the argumentation differs from the structure in the second.
First, I will reconstruct the argumentation on the level of the main argumentation,
5
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then the argumentation on the level of the subordinate argumentation.

The level of the main argumentation
In both contexts, the judge defends his decision not to apply the rule by referring to
the consequences of application (1.1a) and by evaluating these consequences as unacceptable
(1.1b). On the level of the main argumentation, the argumentation scheme underlying the
argumentation is the argumentation scheme of pragmatic argumentation that expresses a
causal relation between the argument referring to the consequences and the standpoint. The
consequences are evaluated as negative or positive. Following Feteris (2002a), this
argumentation can be reconstructed as the negative form of pragmatic argumentation:
(A)

Standpoint 1 In this concrete case, rule X should not be applied (-X)
Because
1.1a In this concrete case, application of X would lead to Y
1.1b Y is unacceptable from a legal perspective
(1.1a-1.1b')
If Y is unacceptable from a legal perspective, and application
of X would lead to Y in this concrete case, then X should not
be applied

In the context of (B) the judge decides to apply the rule, although not in the proposed
interpretation X' but in another interpretation X''. This has consequences for the complexity
of the argumentation, because the argumentation consists of coordinative argumentation in
defense of two standpoints: a justification of the negative standpoint (-X) and a justification
of the positive standpoint (+X):
(B)

Standpoint

1

In this concrete case, rule X should not be applied in the
restricted literal interpretation X' (-X')
1.1a In this concrete case, application of X in the restricted
literal interpretation X' would lead to Y'
1.1b Y' is unacceptable from a legal perspective

2

In this concrete case, rule X should be applied in an extensive
interpretation (+X'')
2.1a In this concrete case, application of X in interpretation
X'' would lead to Y''
2.1b Y''is acceptable from a legal perspective
(2.1a-2.1b)
If Y'' is acceptable from a legal perspective and X''
would lead to Y'' in this concrete case, then X'' should
be applied in the concrete case

Because

Standpoint

Underlying the argumentation is the general argument (1.1a-1.1b-2.1a-2.1b'):
If Y' is unacceptable from a legal perspective, and application of X (in the literal
interpretation X') would lead to Y' in this concrete case, then X should not be applied
(in the literal interpretation X'), and if interpretation X'' of X would lead to Y'' and Y''
is acceptable from a legal perspective, interpretation X'' is to be preferred
6
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that expresses how the judge has weighed the consequences of the two rival interpretations.
I use the general term 'unacceptable' to refer to consequences that are unacceptable,
undesirable, absurd, etcetera.
The level of the subordinate argumentation
In the legal literature it became clear that the emphasis lies on the justification of the
normative argument 1.1.b/2.1b that the consequences of application in the concrete case are
(un)acceptable from a legal perspective. As we have seen in the previous section, the
argument referring to the unacceptability of the consequences of application in the literal
interpretation and the acceptability of the proposed interpretation must be justified by
referring to certain legal presuppositions. The question to be answered is how the
argumentative relation between the (un)acceptability of the consequences and these legal
presuppositions could be reconstructed from a pragma-dialectical perspective.
The general idea among the legal authors is that the result of application in the
concrete case is evaluated from the perspective of the requirements of a reasonable
application of law. In their view, a reasonable application in a concrete situation should not
yield results that are unacceptable or absurd in light of the purposes, goals, principles, values
etcetera the rule is intended to realize. They invoke the intention of a rational legislator,
which functions as an ideal that prescribes consistency in the application of law, that is that
judges should apply legal rules in such a way that the results of application are compatible
with the goals and purposes of the rules.
The argumentation underlying these presuppositions can be reconstructed as
argumentation expressing that a certain result would be (un)acceptable because it is
(in)compatible with a particular goal, value etc.16
Substandpoint
Because

1.1b
1.1b.1a
1.1b.1b

Y is (un)acceptable
Y is (in)compatible with goal G (principle P, value V,
etcetera)
Goal G is a rational goal objectively prescribed by the
valid legal order17

(1.1b.1a-b')
If goal G is a rational goal objectively prescribed by the
valid legal order, and if Y is (in)compatible with this
goal G, then Y is (u)acceptable from a legal perspective
The rationale for a reasonable application of law is that a rational legislator cannot have
intended an application of rule X that would lead to a consequence Y which is unacceptable
because it is incompatible with goal D etcetera. Therefore, a reasonable application of law
requires that the judge apply the rule in the interpretation that is consistent with the goals
etcetera that a rational legislator is supposed to have intended.
From a pragma-dialectical perspective, the argumentation scheme underlying the
subordinate argumentation is an argumentation scheme based on a symptomatic relation in
which it is decided that, given certain characteristics, something belongs to a certain category,
deserves a certain predicate, etc. In this case it is contended that if the result of a legal
decision has the characteristic that it is (in)compatible with certain legal goals etcetera, this
decision is (un)acceptable.18,19
If, on this sub-level, the judge refers to the goals and intentions of the legislator, from
7
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a legal perspective the symptomatic argumentation can be considered as a specific form of
objective-teleological argumentation. It is argued that the rejected application/interpretation is
incompatible with a particular objectively prescribed legal goal. If the judge also proposes an
alternative interpretation, he argues that the preferred interpretation is compatible with this
objectively prescribed goal.
In the following section, by way of illustration, I will discuss some examples of these
forms of argumentation from unacceptable consequences and I will show how they can be
reconstructed from a pragma-dialectical perspective.

3.2

An exemplary analysis of examples of arguments from unacceptable consequences
with an appeal to a reasonable application of law

In this section I will demonstrate how the above described pragma-dialectical
perspective enables us to reconstruct the argumentation underlying the justification of legal
decisions in concrete cases in which the judge defends the decision not to apply a legal rule
on the basis of the unacceptable consequences of a literal interpretation and by appealing to a
reasonable application of law.
First, in 3.2.1, I will discuss two examples from the situation characterized in the
previous section as context (A) when a judge decides not to apply a legal rule in its strict
literal interpretation and where the standpoint is: 'rule X should not be applied' (-X). Second,
in 3.2.2, I will discuss two examples from context (B) when a judge decides not to apply a
legal rule in the strict literal interpretation (- X') but in another extensive (teleological)
interpretation (+X'').

3.2.1 The decision not to apply rule X in the strict literal interpretation (context A)
In the first case the Supreme Court decides not to apply a rule that, according to the
judge in appeal, seems applicable in the literal interpretation in the concrete case. The case is
about the question whether a wife can be deprived of her right to compensation for the
physical injuries that make her unable to work if these injuries have been caused by an
accident that has been caused by her husband's fault. The question is whether the rule of
clause 95 of the Statute of Accidents of 1921 that obliges the driver of a car to pay the
damages that are caused by his fault, is also applicable between spouses. The Supreme Court
rules that the rule that holds the husband liable for the damages does not force to the
conclusion that the wife is denied compensation, because it would lead to the unacceptable
result that the wife would be deprived of her right to compensation, which would be
incompatible with the goal of the rule. According to the Supreme Court, a reasonable
application of law implies that a rule should not be applied if application has consequences
that are unacceptable from the perspective of the goal of the rule and that the legislator
evidently could not have wanted if he had thought about these cases.
In this case, Mrs. Millenaar has been wounded in an accident caused by her
husband.20 As a consequence of these injuries, she has become unable to work. The insurance
company of her former employer pays her the costs necessary for medical treatment.
Subsequently, the insurance company sues the husband and claims that he should pay them
back the costs because he has caused the accident through his fault. As a support for their
claim, the insurance company refers to clause 95 of the dutch Industrial Accident Act
(Ongevallenwet) of 1921, saying that the driver of a car is liable for the damages he has
8
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caused by his fault. Therefore the insurance company is of the opinion that Mr. Millenaar
should pay his wife the damages, which implies that he should pay the insurance company
back the costs they have paid to Mrs. Millenaar.
Finally, the Supreme Court decides that clause 95 does not apply in this case because
application would lead to the unacceptable result that Mrs. Millenaar would not receive
compensation because her husband is the person who has caused the accident. The Supreme
Court gives the following justification:
that this course of events, which would lead to the result that the insured would be
deprived of the compensation she is entitled to on the basis of the Industrial Accident
Act of 1921 (for which marriage nor fault are relevant), because she has community
of property with the person who has caused the accident through his fault, is so
incompatible with the purport of the legal accident insurance, that a reasonable
interpretation of clause 95 of that act implies that this clause should not be
applied in the concrete case;
A pragma-dialectical reconstruction is as follows:
Standpoint:
Because:

Because

-X

In this concrete case, the rule of clause 95 of the Industrial
Accident Act should not be applied
1.1a

Application would lead to the result that Mrs.
Millenaar would be deprived of her right to
compensation based on the Industrial Accident
Act on the sole ground that she has community
of property with the person who has caused the
accident through his fault (Application of X
would lead to Y)

1.1b

It is unacceptable that Mrs. Millenaar would be
deprived of her right to compensation based on
the Industrial Accident Act for the sole reason
that she has community of property with the
person who has caused the accident through his
fault (Y is unacceptable)

1.1b.1

This is incompatible with the purport of the
Industrial Accident Act (Y is incompatible with
goal G)

3.2.2 The decision not to apply rule X in the strict literal interpretation X' but in another
extensive teleological interpretation X'' (context B)
In the following two cases, the Supreme Court does not only reject a literal
interpretation but also proposes an alternative interpretation. Because the Supreme Court
defends two standpoints, the structure of the argumentation is more complex than in the
previous case.
The two cases are about the legalization of a child that has not yet been recognized by
9
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the father. In the first case the father dies before he has knowledge of the pregnancy, in the
second case he lapses into a coma before the child is born. In these cases the central question
is whether the rule of 1:215,2 of the Dutch Civil Code:
1. If after the recognition of a child the planned marriage of its parents has become
impossible because of the death of one of them, legalization can be requested of the
King. The request can be submitted by the surviving parent or, if this parent dies, by
the child.
2. The request for legalization can also be submitted if the man who, having
knowledge of the pregnancy, had the intention of marrying the mother but dies before
the child is born without having recognized the child.
is also applicable in these situations. In a literal interpretation, this rule would not be
applicable. In the first case it would not be applicable because it requires knowledge of the
pregnancy as a condition for legalization. In the second case it would not be applicable
because it requires that the father dies before the child is born. However, in both cases, the
Supreme Court is of the opinion that the result of such a literal interpretation would be
unacceptable in the light of the goal of the rule. In his view, a reasonable application of the
law implies that the rule should not be applied in the literal interpretation (which would lead
to a rejection of the request for legalization) but should be applied extensively in these
concrete cases (which would lead to granting the request for legalization).
In the first case, (Hoge Raad December 3, 1992, NJ 1993, 731), the Supreme Court
rules:
'A strict application of this requirement would, in a case like the present
case, lead to an unacceptable result, that evidently has not been intended by the
legislator: the child is refused the state of a legal child for the sole reason that the
father died so soon after the conception that he could not have had knowledge of the
pregnancy. The purport of the rule - legalization of a child that has not yet been
recognized in cases in which an intended marriage cannot take place because of the
death of the father - does not oblige to accept this result. A reasonable application of
law therefore implies that the facts that resulted from hearing the mother, that the
father wanted to beget a child by the mother and that the mother would have informed
the father of her pregnancy as soon as this would have been possible, are sufficient.
From the above it follows that the conditions of clause 215, 2 are fulfilled and that
there is no impediment against granting the request, which implies that according to
the Supreme Court the request can be granted.
In the second case (Hoge Raad November 21, 1996, NJ 1997, 422) the Supreme Court rules:
It would, however, lead to an unacceptable result, that the legislator
evidently cannot have intended, that these circumstances would impede granting the
request for legalization. Thus the child would be denied the state of a legal child for
the sole reason that the father, with whom it was impossible to have any contact since
several days before the child was born, died several days after the child was born. The
purport of clause 1:215, 2 is to make it possible to legalize a child that has not yet
been recognized in cases in which the intended marriage cannot take place because of
the death of the father. It is in keeping with this purport to treat the present case in a
similar way as the case in which the man dies before the child is born. From the above
10
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it follows that the conditions for legalization have been fulfilled and that there is no
impediment to granting the request, so that, according to the Supreme Court, the
request can be granted.
From a pragma-dialectical perspective, the argumentation in these cases could be
reconstructed as follows, using the model B:
Standpoint:

1

Because:

In this concrete case, the rule of 1:215,2 of the Dutch Civil Code
should not be applied in the literal restricted interpretation X'
(implying that the rule is not applicable in a situation in which the man
dies before he knows about the pregnancy/lapses into a coma before
the child is born (-X')
1.1a

Strict application in the literal interpretation (X') would
lead to the unacceptable result (Y'), that the legislator
evidently cannot have intended, that the child would be
refused the status of a legal child for the sole reason that
the father died so soon after the conception that he
could not have had knowledge about the pregnancy/that
the father lapsed into a coma before the child was born

1.1b

It is unacceptable that the child would be refused the
status of a legal child on the sole ground that the father
died so soon after the conception that he could not have
had knowledge about the pregnancy/that the father
lapsed into a coma before the child was born (Y' is
unacceptable from a legal perspective)

1.1b.1 The purport of the rule (to make it possible to legalize a child
that has not yet been acknowledged in cases in which the
planned marriage cannot take place because of the dead of the
father) does not oblige to accept this result (Y' is incompatible
with G)
Standpoint

2

In this concrete case, the rule of 1:215,2 of the Dutch Civil Code
should be applied in an extensive interpretation (+ X'') (implying that
the rule is also applicable in a situation in which the man dies before he
knows about the pregnancy/lapses into a coma before the child is born)

In the first case, the following argument in support of 2 is put forward:
2.1a

On the basis of the purport of the rule the situation in
which the father wanted to beget a child by the mother
and dies before he has knowledge of the pregnancy
belongs to the area of application of the rule (Y is
compatible with G)
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3.3

The pragma-dialectical analysis of arguments from unacceptable consequences

In all three cases (that invoke a reasonable application of law) we saw that the
Supreme Court justifies his decision not to apply a rule by referring the unacceptability of the
consequences of application of the rejected interpretation, and by referring to the
acceptability of the consequences of the preferred interpretation. The unacceptability of the
consequences is defended by stating that these consequences are incompatible with the
purport of the rule.
These reconstructions show that argumentation based on a reasonable application of
law can be reconstructed as a complex form of argumentation consisting of pragmatic
argumentation referring to the unacceptable consequences of application on the main level
and symptomatic argumentation referring to the incompatibility of the consequences with the
purport or goal of the rule on the subordinate level. In all three cases, from the perspective of
a reasonable application of law, a decision that would lead to consequences that are
unacceptable because they are incompatible with the purpose of the rule relevant in this case,
should not be given.
These reconstructions also show that the complexity of the argumentation on the main
level is connected to the amount of standpoints that are in dispute. In the second and third
case that are examples of context (B), the Court rejects a restricted literal interpretation (X')
and opts for an extensive objective-teleological interpretation (X''). The argumentation on the
main level reflects how the two interpretations are weighed against each other on the basis of
compatibility with the goal of the rule and consistency with the principles and values
underlying this goal.
The pragma-dialectical instrument for the analysis of argumentation from
unacceptable consequences appealing to a reasonable application of law shows how this form
of argumentation can be reconstructed in a rational way as a specific implementation of a
complex form of argumentation that tries to show that the decision in the concrete case is
acceptable from the perspective of fairness in the concrete case that takes into account the
consequences of application in the concrete situation and that the decision is acceptable from
the perspective of the legal system, e.g. that it is consistent with the legal system as a whole,
with other relevant rules, principles, goals and values.
In the following section I will explain how the pragma-dialectical perspective enables
us to specify how the argumentation thus reconstructed can be submitted to rational critique.

4.

The evaluation of argumentation from unacceptable consequences

From a pragma-dialectical perspective, for the evaluation of the various
argumentation schemes that underlie the complex structure of argumentation from
unacceptable consequences, various types of critical questions are relevant. The rationale for
reconstructing the argumentation schemes is to be able to establish which critical questions
are relevant in the evaluation of various forms of argumentation.
The first type of critical question asks whether this type of argumentation is an
adequate way of defending this type of standpoint in this context. The second type of
question asks whether the argumentation has been applied correctly in the concrete case. In
what follows, in 4.2 I will address the first type of question, and in 4.3 I will address the
second type of question.
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4.1

Are arguments from unacceptable consequences an adequate way of defending a
legal decision?

The pragma-dialectical reconstruction of the complex structure of argumentation from
unacceptable consequences appealing to a reasonable application of law made clear that this
form of argumentation, to be adequate as a complete justification of the decision, should
consist of two levels. On the main level the judge should explain that the consequences are
unacceptable. To justify that the consequences are unacceptable, it is necessary to justify on
the subordinate level why they are unacceptable in the context of the application of law. A
complete justification consists of pragmatic argumentation underlying an argument from
negative consequences and symptomatic argumentation consisting of objective-teleological
argumentation.
This requirement for a complete justification is in accordance with ideas developed in
legal theory I have described in 2. As I have also described elsewhere (Feteris 2003a), and
according to legal authors such as Bell (1983), Gottlieb (1968), MacCormick (1978),
Summers (1978), a complete justification of the interpretation of a legal decision should
consist of both arguments referring to the effects of the legal decision and arguments that
relate the decision to the legal system. A complete justification in the ideal situation consists
of arguments from consequences referring to the consequences of applying the rule in the
concrete case and similar future cases, and arguments from consistency that show that the
decision is consistent with the principles, goals, values etcetera of the legal system.
The first question to be answered in the evaluation is whether the complex
argumentation consisting of pragmatic argumentation referring to unacceptable consequences
and symptomatic-objective-teleological argumentation referring to the incompatibility of
these consequences with the goal of the rule from the perspective of a reasonable application
of law, is an adequate way of defending a legal decision. As I have explained elsewhere in
Feteris (2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b), pragmatic argumentation and objective-teleological
argumentation can form an adequate way of defending a legal decision.
From the perspective of a modern approach of the hierarchy of interpretation
methods, these forms of argumentation belonging to the category of objectiveteleological/evaluative argumentation can form an acceptable justification if the judge
justifies why a literal and a systematic interpretation, that refer to the explicit intentions of the
legislator, do not lead to acceptable results. The judge can justify his decision not to apply the
rule (in the literal interpretation) by referring to the (reconstructed) objective rational
intention of the legislator by explaining that the preferred solution is based on what a rational
legislator is supposed to have intended as the preferred interpretation of the rule if he had
thought of the present case.
On the basis of this hierarchy, the relevant questions with respect to pragmatic and
objective-teleological argumentation are:
1a

Does the judge explain why a linguistic and a systematic interpretation do not offer an
acceptable interpretation of rule R?

1b

Does the judge explain why the proposed interpretation is desirable from the
perspective of its consequences in the concrete case and from the perspective of the
goals, principles and values of the legal system?
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4.2

Has the argumentation from negative consequences been applied correctly in the
concrete case?

From a pragma-dialectical perspective, for different forms of argumentation schemes
different critical questions are relevant with respect to a correct application in the concrete
case. In earlier publications Feteris (2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b) I have described the critical
questions that are relevant for the argumentation scheme of pragmatic argumentation and the
argumentation scheme of symptomatic objective-teleological argumentation.21

Critical questions for pragmatic argumentation
As I have explained in Feteris (2003a), pragmatic argumentation is a form of general
practical argumentation that is also used in the law in the context of the application and
interpretation of legal rules.
For the normative argument:
2

Is Y indeed (un)acceptable in light of relevant legal principles, social goals and
values?

For the empirical argument:
3

Does X' indeed lead to Y?

Critical questions for objective-teleological argumentation
As I have explained in Feteris (2003b), objective-teleological argumentation is a
specific legal implementation of the general form of pragmatic argumentation. For the
context of the interpretation of legal rules I have formulated the following questions:
2a
2b
3a
4a
4b

Is goal G indeed a rational goal objectively prescribed by the valid legal order and is
goal G based on general legal principles and/or values underlying the legal order?
Is attaining goal G not inconsistent with other goals G', G'' etc.?
Is Y indeed incompatible with goal G?
Does interpretation R' have any undesirable side-effects?
Is R' coherent and consistent with relevant legal values and principles?

The critical questions thus formulated on the basis of an integration of pragma-dialectical and
legal-theoretical ideas, specify which forms of critique are relevant in the evaluation of
argumentation from unacceptable consequences from the perspective of a reasonable
application of law. If the critical questions can be answered satisfactorily, the argumentation
constitutes a sufficient justification of a legal decision.

5

Conclusion

In this contribution I have analyzed the role of arguments from unacceptable
consequences appealing to reasonableness in the justification of judicial opinions. Integrating
14
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ideas from pragma-dialectical argumentation theory and legal theory, I have clarified the
complex argumentation structure of this form of argumentation and the argumentation
schemes underlying this complex argumentation. I have explained which forms of rational
critique are relevant in the evaluation.
By clarifying the structure and content of this form of complex argumentation, I have
established that a complete version of this form of argumentation is a specific implementation
of the argumentation that is, according to various authors in modern legal theory, the standard
for a sound justification of the interpretation of a legal rule. In the case of the argumentation I
discussed here, the argumentation consists of general practical argumentation (pragmatic
argumentation) and objective-teleological argumentation (symptomatic argumentation).
The pragma-dialectical reconstruction of the argumentation clarified that the element
of the argumentation that invokes the evaluative moral element is the argument referring to
the unacceptability of the consequences in the main argumentation. To connect this
evaluative element to the law, the subordinate argumentation on the second level functions as
a justification which shows why the consequence is unacceptable from a legal point of view.
With this argumentation, the judge refers to the (reconstructed) objective goals and values
underlying the legal system, that are the goals and values a rational legislator is supposed to
realize and secure by formulating this rule. Given these goals and values, it would be against
the intentions of a rational legislator to apply a rule that would lead to results that are
incompatible with these goals and values. The appeal to reasonableness thus implies that the
judge tries to show that the consequences in the concrete case are unacceptable from the
perspective of a rational legislator. The proposal for a reasonable application of the rule in the
concrete case implies that a solution is proposed and justified that is compatible with the
goals of a rational legislator.
The pragma-dialectical reconstruction offers an important supplement to the legaltheoretical literature in various respects.
First, the pragma-dialectical reconstruction makes clear that various forms of
argumentation such as arguments from absurdity, etc. and a reasonable application of law that
are treated as completely different forms of argumentation in legal theory, could be
considered as different variants of the same type of argumentation, the negative form of
pragmatic argumentation, argumentation referring to negatively evaluated consequences.
Second, I have shown that the pragma-dialectical approach makes it possible to give a
systematic reconstruction of the complex structure of this form of argumentation by taking
into account the various aspects of the difference of opinion. Authors in legal theory such as
Alexy only describe the elements and the structure of the reductio ad absurdum on the main
level, but do not go into the justification of the unacceptability of the consequences on the
sub-level. Furthermore they do not always take into account the possibility of a balancing of
various alternative interpretations.22
Third, I have established that the argumentation schemes underlying the
argumentation on the main level and sub-level are different forms of argumentation. They can
be reconstructed as pragmatic-consequentialist argumentation on the main level and
symptomatic-objective-teleological argumentation on the sub-level, and argumentation of
consistency with legal principles and values on the lowest level. Most authors in legal theory
only say that arguments from absurdity can be considered as a form of teleological
argumentation, but they do not specify the content and structure of this argumentation.
I have explained that arguments from reasonableness can be an acceptable way of
justifying a judicial opinion if certain conditions are fulfilled. I have explained that, from a
legal perspective, 'reasonableness' is not necessarily a subjective criterion that is not open for
discussion. By referring to the unacceptability of the rejected outcome and the acceptability
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of the preferred solution a judge can explicitly account for the balancing of a legally desirable
and a legally undesirable solution. In doing so, he has the obligation to refer to objective
goals intended by the legislator and to the principles and values underlying these goals. By
explicitly referring to these legal considerations, he opens his argumentation to rational
critique and intersubjective testing.
To be able to get a better understanding of the legal backgrounds of this form of
argumentation, further research into the legal, argumentation-theoretical and philosophical
definitions and uses of the concepts 'rational', 'reasonable', 'consistency' and 'incompatibility'
are required. Furthermore, to get a systematic insight into the way in which this form of
argumentation is used in legal practice, further reconstructions using the pragma-dialectical
perspective developed here for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation from
unacceptable consequences should be carried out.

Notes

1. Art. 6:248 lid 2 B.W.: 'Een tussen partijen als gevolg van de overeenkomst geldende regel
is niet van toepassing, voor zover dit in de gegeven omstandigheden naar maatstaven van
redelijkheid en billijkheid onaanvaardbaar zou zijn.'
2. The term 'reductio ad absurdum' is used by Golding (1984:59), La Torre et al. in
MacCormick and Summers (1991:222), the term 'argument from absurdity' by Bankowski
and MacCormick in MacCormick and Summers (1991:366), the term 'argument from
unacceptability' by Alexy (1989:283), the term 'apagocial argument' by Perelman (1979a),
Tarello (1972, 1980) and La Torre a.o. in MacCormick and Summers (1991:233).
3. See Pontier (1995:38) and Veegens (1971:284). Algemene bezwaren tegen
resultatenrechtsvinding omdat daarmee een beroep wordt gedaan op een buitenjuridisch
criterium.
4. Walton (1996:75-77) is of the opinion that in the general context of deliberation an
argument from consequences (whether positive or negative) is an acceptable way of arguing.
Certain forms of argumentation from negative consequences, that Walton calls threat appeal
arguments can be fallacious if they constitute an illicit shift to a different type of dialogue. In
the context of arguments from reasonableness in the application of law discussed here, this
fallacious use of threat appeal arguments does not occur.
5. See also Wróblewski (1991:105-106).
6. See Aarnio (152-163) for Finland, La Torre, Pattaro, Taruffo (221-222) for Italy,
Bankowski and MacCormick (371-373) for England and Scotland, Peczenik (312) for
Sweden in MacCormick and Summers (1991).
7. In MacCormick and Summers (1991:371) Bankowski and MacCormick argue that there is
a specific form of teleological argumentation, an argument from 'justice', that refers to the
goal of the rule in the light of what Dworkin (1986) calls the 'integrity' of the legal system.
An argument on the basis of integrity goes further than the ius positivum and becomes more
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axiological in a wider sense. Bankowski and MacCormick ask themselves in this context how
far this gets one beyond merely expressing an appeal to straightforwardly legal principles and
values.
8. See for example Geppaart (1968), Wiarda (1999:40).
9. According to the Dutch authors den Boer (1991) who discusses the use of this form of
argumentation in the context of tax law, the decision not to apply a legal rule on the basis of
unacceptable consequences will occur in situations in which the quality of the legislation is
poor or if there are important changes in society after the rule has been formulated (because
of technological or ideological developments) which make that the law has become out of
date. Other developments that play a role are the influence of civil law, non-discrimination
clauses in treaties, a balancing on the basis of general principles, etcetera.
10. For a similar description see Golding (1984:58-59) who considers the reductio ad
absurdum as a specific form of goal argumentation. The argumentation states that because X
is a goal the law ought to promote, and legal recognition of Y would defeat the realization of
X, Y ought to be prevented by the law/ought not to be legally recognized.
11. Alexy uses the German term 'Untragbarkeitsargument' (1978:345-346) and the English
term 'argument from unacceptability' (1989:283-284). Alexy takes this description of the
analysis of this form of argumentation by U. Diederichsen, 'Die 'reductio ad absurdum' in der
Jurisprudenz', In: Festschrift f. K. Larenz, hrsg. von G. Paulus und U. Diederichsen, C.-W.
Canaris, München 1973, pp. 155-179.
12. In Alexy's view, (J.17) is a strong form of an argument from unacceptability, weaker
forms would involve showing that Z is not absolutely prohibited but that it is only the worst
of available alternatives.
13. Aarnio (1991:152-153) contends that the concept of the rational legislator also contains a
presupposition of morality: the legislator is assumed to seek only results that are in harmony
with the prevailing system of morality and values. In this respect Aarnio considers the
demand of justice as part of the rational drafting of legislation.
14. Aarnio in MacCormick and Summers (1991:131) stresses that one of the major problems
in adjudication in Finland will be the balancing of the relative weight of predictability and
equity in the individual case must established. Overemphasis on predictability (for example
'pacta sunt servanda') leads to a rigid attitude, while an emphasis on equity in the individual
case leads to a decrease in predictability. Peczenik (1989:198-204) specifies what consistency
and coherency in a legal context imply. For a description of arguments from coherence and
consistency see MacCormick (1978).
15. For a description of the principles of rationality in law see Aarnio (1987), Alexy (1981),
Aarnio, Alexy and Peczenik (1991), and Peczenik (1989).
16. In Dutch examples of this form of argumentation judges use the formulation 'is strijdig
met' or 'is in strijd met' to express that the result is incompatible with the goals etcetera of the
rule.
17. In its present form, the reasoning underlying this form of argumentation is invalid. To
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make the argumentation complete and logically valid, certain translations and additions are
required.
18. Cf. Schellens (1985:127-140) who describes two ways in which a rule can be justified
(apart from a justification on the basis of authority and a justification on the basis of similar
cases). The first mode of justification is on the basis of coherence with other rules (he calls
this internal justification):
R1 is coherent with/follows from R2
R2 is acceptable
Therefore: R1 is acceptable.

The second mode of justification is on the basis of the consequences of application:
Application of R leads to A etc.
A etc. is desirable
Therefore: R is acceptable.
19. Schellens (1985:130 ff.) would characterize this form of argumentation as argumentation
on the basis of evaluation rules: given certain characteristics, a certain evaluation should be
applied. The relation between the characteristics and application of the evaluative predicate
can be one of necessary conditions, sufficient conditions, and necessary and sufficient
conditions.
20. Hoge Raad February 2, 1973, NJ 1973, 225.
21. From a pragma-dialectical perspective we can distinguish two forms of objectiveteleological argumentation: one form based on pragmatic argumentation described in Feteris
(2003b) and one form based on symptomatic argumentation described here. In both cases, for
the normative argument 1.1b.1b the same critical questions are relevant.
22. As has been argued by various legal authors such as Bertea (2003) and MacCormick and
Summers (1991:529) not all forms of legal argumentation can be easily reduced to classical
forms of legal reasoning or single arguments. I have shown that by using the pragmadialectical perspective it can be accounted for how various forms of legal argumentation can
be related in a complex argumentation, and how the various forms of argumentation can have
a function on various levels.
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